Authority
This document has been developed by NIST in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities (under the Computer Security Act of 1987 and the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, specifically 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3(a) (5)). This is not a guideline within the meaning of (15 U.S.C. 278 g-3 (a)(3)).
These guidelines are for use by Federal organizations which process sensitive information.
1 They are consistent with the requirements of OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III.
The guidelines herein are not mandatory and binding standards. This document may be used by non-governmental organizations on a voluntary basis. It is not subject to copyright.
Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding upon Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under his statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or any other Federal official.
Purpose
The purpose of the Engineering Principles for Information Technology (IT) Security (EP-ITS) is to present a list of system-level security principles to be considered in the design, development, and operation of an information system.
Ideally, the principles presented here would be used from the onset of a program-at the beginning of, or during the design phase-and then employed throughout the system's life-cycle. However, these principles are also helpful in affirming and confirming the security posture of already deployed information systems. The principles are short and concise and can be used by organizations to develop their system life-cycle policies. Principle n. -A rule or standard, especially of good behavior.
American Heritage Dictionary
Scope
This document is published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as recommended guidance for Federal departments and agencies and is intended to be used by both the government and the private sector.
This document should be used by those interested in IT security and is applicable to all IT systems, including general support systems and major applications.
This document presents generic principles that apply to all systems. It is anticipated that the application of these generic principles to specific technology areas will be accomplished by use of this document in developing more detailed guidance.
Audience
The principles presented herein can be used by:
! Users when developing and evaluating functional requirements, or when operating information systems within their organizations.
! System Engineers and Architects when designing, implementing, or modifying an information system.
!

IT Specialists
2 during all phases of the system life-cycle.
!
Program Managers and Information System Security Officers (ISSO) to ensure adequate security measures have been considered for all phases of the system life-cycle.
Document Structure
Section 1 of this document provided the purpose and scope, and clarified the intended audience. Section 2 provides background information, including how this document is related to other NIST, Federal, and international documents and initiatives including Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, SP 800-14, September 1996, and the Common Criteria. Section 3, the main section of this document, presents 32 security principles and identifies their applicability in the life-cycle phases. Section 4 is a short summary. This document also has three appendices; Appendix A provides background on the new OPM IT specialist sub-categories. It also contains a table that identifies when in the system life-cycle they might be most involved with security. Appendix B defines terms used in this document and Appendix C provides a list of referenced documents. 3/21/01
BACKGROUND
Private businesses and government agencies, both foreign and domestic, are becoming increasingly reliant on information technology to fulfill many basic functions. Businesses are making changes simply to remain competitive in the changing global marketplace. Likewise, government agencies are seeking to provide better service to their citizens.
Regardless of the reason, the move to a digital economy has caused information and information technology to become valuable business assets that need to be protected. With this development has come the recognition that fulfilling these basic functions requires as a matter of course comprehensive, well-designed, and reliable information system security programs.
Information system security program standards, guidance, and implementation strategies have been, or are being, developed by public and private sector organizations in the United States and abroad. These wide-ranging efforts are designed to address many aspects of information security at many levels of detail. They address specific topics such as public key infrastructure (PKI) and certification and accreditation (C&A) processes, and more general topics such as organizational best practices.
Seeking to support and guide these many efforts, several private and public organizations have developed a number of explicit and implicit information system security principles. These security principles, in turn, have the potential to become an extensive canon for users, designers, and engineers to consider in designing information system security programs.
This document seeks to compile and present many of these security principles into one, easy-touse document for those concerned with information system security. In contrast to other organization-level efforts, the principles presented in this document are structured around a system-level, engineering approach.
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems (SP 800-14)
SP 800-14 provides a foundation upon which organizations can establish and review information technology security programs. The eight Generally Accepted System Security Principles in SP 800-14 are designed to provide the public or private sector audience with an organization-level perspective when creating new systems, practices, or policies.
While derived primarily from concepts found in the eight principles and 14 practices identified in the SP 800-14, the EP-ITS principles provide a system-level (versus organizational-level) perspective for information technology security.
It should be noted the EP-ITS principles are not ordered under the same headings used in SP 800-14. This is due to the different focus for the two documents and is akin to the loose relationship between principles and practices that exists in SP 800-14. 3/21/01
Common Criteria
The Common Criteria (CC) is a repeatable methodology for documenting IT security requirements, documenting and validating product security capabilities, and promoting international cooperation in the area of IT security.
Use of Common Criteria "protection profiles" and "security targets" greatly aids the development of products or systems that have IT security functions. The rigor and repeatability of the Common Criteria methodology provides for thorough definition of user security needs. Validated security targets provide system integrators with key information needed in the procurement of security components and implementation of secure IT. The approach of this document meshes with the Common Criteria methodology.
Defense-in-Depth
Securing information and systems against the full spectrum of threats requires the use of multiple, overlapping protection approaches addressing the people, technology, and operational aspects of information technology. This is due to the highly interactive nature of the various systems and networks, and the fact that any single system cannot be adequately secured unless all interconnecting systems are also secured.
By using multiple, overlapping protection approaches, the failure or circumvention of any individual protection approach will not leave the system unprotected. Through user training and awareness, well-crafted policies and procedures, and redundancy of protection mechanisms, layered protections enables effective protection of information technology for the purpose of achieving mission objectives.
For example, this fundamental need for layered protections is captured in the "Defense-in-Depth" strategy being used by DoD for protecting information systems, both classified and unclassified, and is described in Department of Defense Global Information Grid Information Assurance (GIG, http://www.c3i.osd.mil/org/cio/doc/gigia061600.pdf). Additionally, a source of information on implementing layered protections is the Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF, http://www.iatf.net/). The IATF advocates the use of multiple information technology protection methods or approaches following the DoD "Defense-in-Depth" strategy to establish a composite security posture adequate to blunt threats.
Federal agencies may find the GIG and IATF to be useful sources of information.
SECURITY PRINCIPLES
Introduction
To aid in designing a secure information system, NIST compiled a set of engineering principles for system security. These principles provide a foundation upon which a more consistent and structured approach to the design, development, and implementation of IT security capabilities can be constructed.
While the primary focus of these principles is the implementation of technical controls, these principles highlight the fact that, to be effective, a system security design should also consider non-technical issues, such as policy, operational procedures, and user education.
The principles described here do not apply to all systems at all times. Yet each principle should be carefully considered throughout the life-cycle of every system. Moreover, because of the constantly changing information system security environment, the principles identified are not considered to be an inclusive list. Instead, this document is an attempt to present in a logical fashion fundamental security principles that can be used in today's operational environments. As technology improves and security techniques are refined, additions, deletions, and refinement of these security principles will be required.
Each principle has two components. The first is a table that indicates where the principle should be applied during the system life-cycle. The second is an explanatory narrative further amplifying the principle.
The five life-cycle planning phases used are defined in the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, SP 800-14:
In an effort to associate each principle with the relevant life-cycle planning phase(s), a table  similar to the example table below, Table 3 -1, has been developed for each principle. The table identifies each life-cycle phase, and "check marks" are used to indicate if the principle should be considered or applied during the specified phase. One check "✔" signifies the principle can be used to support the life-cycle phase, and two checks "✔✔" signifies the principle is key to successful completion of the life-cycle phase. 
System Life-Cycle Description
The following brief descriptions of each of the five phases of the system life-cycle are taken from Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, SP 800-14. ! Initiation: During the initiation phase, the need for a system is expressed and the purpose of the system is documented. Activities include conducting a sensitivity assessment. ! Development/Acquisition: During this phase, the system is designed, purchased, programmed, developed, or otherwise constructed. This phase often consists of other defined cycles, such as the system development cycle or the acquisition cycle. Activities include determining security requirements, incorporating security requirements into specifications, and obtaining the system. ! Implementation: During implementation, the system is tested and installed or fielded.
Activities include installing/turning on controls, security testing, and accreditation. ! Operation/Maintenance: During this phase, the system performs its work. The system is almost always being continuously modified by the addition of hardware and software and by numerous other events. Activities include security operations and administration, operational assurance, and audits and monitoring. ! Disposal: The disposal phase of the IT system life-cycle involves the disposition of information, hardware, and software. Activities include moving, archiving, discarding or destroying information and sanitizing the media.
IT Security Principles
Principle 1. Establish a sound security policy as the "foundation" for design.
Discussion: A security policy is an important document to develop while designing an information system. The security policy begins with the organization's basic commitment to information security formulated as a general policy statement. The policy is then applied to all aspects of the system design or security solution. The policy identifies security goals (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, and assurance) the system should support, and these goals guide the procedures, standards and controls used in the IT security architecture design. The policy also should require definition of critical assets, the perceived threat, and securityrelated roles and responsibilities. Discussion: Security must be considered in information system design. Experience has shown it is very difficult to implement security measures properly and successfully after a system has been developed, so it should be integrated fully into the system life-cycle process. This includes establishing security policies, understanding the resulting security requirements, participating in the evaluation of security products, and finally in the engineering, design, implementation, and disposal of the system. Sometimes a boundary is defined by people, information, and information technology associated with one physical location. But this ignores the reality that, within a single location, many different security policies may be in place, some covering publicly accessible information and some covering sensitive unclassified information. Other times a boundary is defined by a security policy that governs a specific set of information and information technology that can cross physical boundaries. Further complicating the matter is that, many times, a single machine or server may house both public-access and sensitive unclassified information. As a result, multiple security policies may apply to a single machine or within a single system. Therefore, when developing an information system, security boundaries must be considered and communicated in relevant system documentation and security policies. Discussion: Risk is defined as the combination of the probability that a particular threat source will exploit, or trigger, a particular information system vulnerability and the resulting mission impact should this occur. Previously, risk avoidance was a common IT security goal. That changed as the nature of the risk became better understood. Today, it is recognized that elimination of all risk is not cost-effective. A cost-benefit analysis should be conducted for each proposed control. In some cases, the benefits of a more secure system may not justify the direct and indirect costs. Benefits include more than just prevention of monetary loss; for example, controls may be essential for maintaining public trust and confidence. Direct costs include the cost of purchasing and installing a given technology; indirect costs include decreased system performance and additional training. The goal is to enhance mission/business capabilities by managing mission/business risk to an acceptable level. 
Discussion:
The term information domain arises from the practice of partitioning information resources according to access control, need, and levels of protection required. Organizations implement specific measures to enforce this partitioning and to provide for the deliberate flow of authorized information between information domains. An external domain is one that is not under your control.
In general, external systems should be considered insecure. Until an external domain has been deemed "trusted," system engineers, architects, and IT specialists should presume the security measures of an external system are different than those of a trusted internal system and design the system security features accordingly. Discussion: Security designs should consider a layered approach to address or protect against a specific threat or to reduce a vulnerability. For example, the use of a packet-filtering router in conjunction with an application gateway and an intrusion detection system combine to increase the work-factor an attacker must expend to successfully attack the system. Adding good password controls and adequate user training improves the system's security posture even more.
The need for layered protections is especially important when commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products are used. Practical experience has shown that the current state-of-the-art for security quality in COTS products does not provide a high degree of protection against sophisticated attacks. It is possible to help mitigate this situation by placing several controls in series, requiring additional work by attackers to accomplish their goals. Discussion: In general, IT security measures are tailored according to an organization's unique needs. While numerous factors, such as the overriding mission requirements, and guidance, are to be considered, the fundamental issue is the protection of the mission or business from IT security-related, negative impacts. Because IT security needs are not uniform, system designers and security practitioners should consider the level of trust when connecting to other external networks and internal sub-domains. Recognizing the uniqueness of each system allows a layered security strategy to be used -implementing lower assurance solutions with lower costs to protect less critical systems and higher assurance solutions only at the most critical areas. Discussion: Often, a single security service is achieved by cooperating elements existing on separate machines. For example, system authentication is typically accomplished using elements ranging from the user-interface on a workstation through the networking elements to an application on an authentication server. It is important to associate all elements with the security service they provide. These components are likely to be shared across systems to achieve security as infrastructure resources come under more senior budget and operational control.
Principle 13. Provide assurance that the system is, and continues to be, resilient in the face of expected threats.
Initiation Devel/Acquis Implement Oper/Maint Disposal Applicability ✔ ✔✔ ✔ ✔✔ ✔ Discussion: Assurance is the grounds for confidence that a system meets its security expectations. These expectations can typically be summarized as providing sufficient resistance to both direct penetration and attempts to circumvent security controls. Good understanding of the threat environment, evaluation of requirement sets, hardware and software engineering disciplines, and product and system evaluations are primary measures used to achieve assurance. Additionally, the documentation of the specific and evolving threats is important in making timely adjustments in applied security and strategically supporting incremental security enhancements. Discussion: An efficient and cost effective security capability should be able to enforce multiple security policies to protect multiple information domains without the need to separate physically the information and respective information systems processing the data. This principle argues for moving away from the traditional practice of creating separate LANs and infrastructures for various sensitivity levels and moving toward solutions that enable the use of common, shared, public infrastructures with appropriate protections at the operating system, application, and workstation level.
Moreover, to accomplish missions and protect critical functions, government and private sector organizations have many types of information to safeguard. With this principle in mind, system engineers, architects, and IT specialists should develop a security capability that allows organizations with multiple levels of information sensitivity to achieve the basic security goals in an efficient manner. 
Discussion:
To control the flow of information and access across network boundaries in computing and communications infrastructures, and to enforce the proper separation of user groups, a suite of access control devices and accompanying access control policies should be used.
Determine the following for communications across network boundaries:
• What external interfaces are required
• Whether information is pushed or pulled
• What ports, protocols, and network services are required
• What requirements exist for system information exchanges; for example, trust relationships, database replication services, and domain name resolution processes. Discussion: As mission and business processes change, security requirements and technical protection methods must be updated. IT-related risks to the mission/business vary over time and undergo periodic assessment. Periodic assessment should be performed to enable system designers and managers to make informed risk management decisions on whether to accept or mitigate identified risks with changes or updates to the security capability. The lack of timely identification through consistent security solution re-evaluation and correction of evolving, applicable IT vulnerabilities results in false trust and increased risk.
Each security mechanism should be able to support migration to new technology or upgrade of new features without requiring an entire system redesign. The security design should be modular so that individual parts of the security design can be upgraded without the requirement to modify the entire system. Although this is a goal, the struggle to achieve this ultimately results in a debate of COTS vendor product alignments versus self-maintained interface code. Discussion: Authentication is the process where a system establishes the validity of a transmission, message, or a means of verifying the eligibility of an individual, process, or machine to carry out a desired action, thereby ensuring that security is not compromised by an untrusted source. It is essential that adequate authentication be achieved in order to implement security policies and achieve security goals. Additionally, level of trust is always an issue when dealing with cross-domain interactions. The solution is to establish an authentication policy and apply it to cross-domain interactions as required. Note: A user may have rights to use more than one name in multiple domains. Further, rights may differ among the domains, potentially leading to security policy violations.
Principle 23.
Use unique identities to ensure accountability.
Discussion: An identity may represent an actual user or a process with its own identity, e.g., a program making a remote access. Unique identities are a required element in order to be able to:
• Maintain accountability and traceability of a user or process • Assign specific rights to an individual user or process • Provide for non-repudiation • Enforce access control decisions • Establish the identity of a peer in a secure communications path • Prevent unauthorized users from masquerading as an authorized user. 
Discussion:
The concept of limiting access, or "least privilege," is simply to provide no more authorizations than necessary to perform required functions. This is perhaps most often applied in the administration of the system. Its goal is to reduce risk by limiting the number of people with access to critical system security controls; i.e., controlling who is allowed to enable or disable system security features or change the privileges of users or programs. Best practice suggests it is better to have several administrators with limited access to security resources rather than one person with "super user" permissions.
Consideration should be given to implementing role-based access controls for various aspects of system use, not only administration. The system security policy can identify and define the various roles of users or processes. Each role is assigned those permissions needed to perform its functions. Each permission specifies a permitted access to a particular resource (such as "read" and "write" access to a specified file or directory, "connect" access to a given host and port, etc.). Unless a permission is granted explicitly, the user or process should not be able to access the protected resource. Discussion: Every security mechanism should support a security service or set of services, and every security service should support one or more security goals. Extra measures should not be implemented if they do not support a recognized service or security goal. Such mechanisms could add unneeded complexity to the system and are potential sources of additional vulnerabilities.
An example is file encryption supporting the access control service that in turn supports the goals of confidentiality and integrity by preventing unauthorized file access. If file encryption is a necessary part of accomplishing the goals, then the mechanism is appropriate. However, if these security goals are adequately supported without inclusion of file encryption, then that mechanism would be an unneeded system complexity. 
The risk of unauthorized modification or destruction of data, disclosure of information, and denial of access to data while in transit should be considered along with the risks associated with data that is in storage or being processed. Therefore, system engineers, architects, and IT specialists should implement security measures to preserve, as needed, the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of data, including application software, while the information is being processed, in transmit, and in storage. Discussion: The more difficult it is to maintain and operate a security control, the less effective that control is likely to be. Therefore, security controls should be designed with ease-of-use as an important consideration. The experience and expertise of administrators and users should be appropriate and proportional to the operation of the security control. An organization must invest the resources necessary to ensure system administrators and users are properly trained. Moreover, administrator and user training costs along with the life-cycle operational costs should be considered when determining the cost-effectiveness of the security control. Discussion: Although a system may be powered down, critical information still resides on the system and could be retrieved by an unauthorized user or organization. Access to critical information systems must be controlled at all times.
At the end of a system's life-cycle, system designers should develop procedures to dispose of an information system's assets in a proper and secure fashion. Procedures must be implemented to ensure system hard drives, volatile memory, and other media are purged to an acceptable level and do not retain residual information. 
It is unwise to assume that developers know how to develop secure software. Therefore, ensure that developers are adequately trained in the development of secure software before developing the system.
3.4
Principle/Life-cycle Summary Table 3 -2 below summarizes the relationship between the 33 principles above and the life-cycles to which they apply. 
SUMMARY
Now, more than ever, IT security is a critical element in the system life-cycle. Security must be incorporated and addressed from the initial planning and design phases to disposal of the system. Without proper attention to security, an organization's information technology can become a source of significant mission risks. With careful planning from the earliest stages, however, security becomes an enabler, supporting and helping to achieve the organization's mission.
As security awareness becomes a way of life within an organization, people at all levels, and roles in the system life-cycle, should have access to easily understood guidance. From users to system administrators and program managers, everyone should have a basic understanding of the security principles governing the system they are using, maintaining, or designing and developing.
This document provides a starting point. The principles contained herein are derived from a number of national and international documents, as well as from the experience of the scientists at NIST. It is hoped that these principles will contribute to improved IT security in any organization.
major application An application that requires special attention to security due to the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to, or modification of, the information in the application. A breach in a major application might comprise many individual application programs and hardware, software, and telecommunications components. Major applications can be either major software applications or a combination of hardware/software where the only purpose of the system is to support a specific mission-related function.
object A passive entity that contains or receives information. Note that access to an object potentially implies access to the information it contains.
risk Within this document, synonymous with "IT-related risk."
risk analysis
The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional safeguards that mitigate this impact. Part of risk management and synonymous with risk assessment.
risk assessment
See risk analysis.
risk management
The ongoing process of assessing the risk to mission/business as part of a risk-based approach used to determine adequate security for a system by analyzing the threats and vulnerabilities and selecting appropriate, costeffective controls to achieve and maintain an acceptable level or risk.
security Security is a system property. Security is much more than a set of functions and mechanisms. IT security is a system characteristic as well as a set of mechanisms that span the system both logically and physically.
security domain A set of subjects, their information objects, and a common security policy.
security policy
The statement of required protection of the information objects.
security goals
The five security goals are confidentiality, availability, integrity, accountability, and assurance.
security service A capability that supports one, or many, of the security goals. Examples of security services are key management, access control, and authentication.
subject An active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or device, that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state.
system integrity
The quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system, whether intentional or accidental.
threat Any circumstance or event with the potential to harm an information system through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service. Threats arise from human actions and natural events.
threat source Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) the situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability.
threat analysis
The examination of threat sources against system vulnerabilities to determine the threats for a particular system in a particular operational environment.
vulnerability
A weakness in system security requirements, design, implementation, or operation, that could be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited and result in a violation of the system's security policy.
